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The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–Module F:
Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP)
Program1
Daniel Thompson,2 and Adam Kulam 3, 4
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
April 15, 2021
Abstract

By late 2008, the secondary mortgage markets were suffering high default rates, causing
mortgage lending to slow and the value of mortgage securities to plummet. The Federal
Reserve lowered the federal funds rate, and the government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac into conservatorship, yet credit in housing and other financial markets remained tight.
On November 25, the Fed announced its intent to purchase up to $500 billion in agency
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and $100 billion in agency debt to reduce the cost and
increase the availability of mortgage credit, which would support housing markets and
improve conditions in financial markets more generally. The Large-Scale Asset Purchase
(LSAP) program (also known as Quantitative Easing I) expanded to include purchases of
$300 billion in longer-term Treasury securities. The Fed began to wind down the program
in September 2009 after purchasing in total $172.1 billion in agency debt, $1.25 trillion in
MBS, and $300 billion in Treasury securities. Over the next several years, the Fed allowed its
holdings of agency debt securities to run off, but it continued to purchase agency MBS and
Treasury securities through subsequent purchase programs. The academic community
This case study is one of seven 2021 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case studies that examine in
detail the various elements of the government’s rescue of the GSEs:
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•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships” by Daniel Thompson
and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson.
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
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generally concurs that the LSAP program succeeded in lowering interest rates, although it
does not agree on its impact, particularly on lowering longer-term interest rates.
Keywords: government-sponsored enterprises, LSAP program, QE, quantitative easing
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Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale
Asset Purchase (LSAP) Program
At a Glance
By late 2008, the secondary mortgage
markets were suffering high rates of
default, causing mortgage lending to
slow and the value of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) to plummet. During the
year, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) lowered the federal
funds rate substantially, but credit
remained tight in housing and across
other financial markets. Given the
continued distress, in September, the
government took into conservatorship
the two large government-sponsored
enterprises supporting the secondary
mortgage market, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac); however,
rates remained high and credit tight.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To reduce mortgage rates and lower longerterm private borrowing rates, thus stimulating the
financial system
Announcement Date
Nov 25, 2008
Operational Date
December 5, 2008 (Agency
Debt)
Jan 5, 2009 (MBS)
March 18, 2009 (Treasury Sec.)
Expiration Date
October 20, 2009 (Treasury
(Purchases)
Sec.)
March 31, 2010 (Debt & MBS)
Legal Authority
Section 14 of the Federal
Reserve Act
Utilization
$172.1 billion (Debt)
$1.25 trillion (MBS)
$300 billion (Treasury Sec.)
Peak Monthly
$15.9 billion; June 2009 (Debt)
Purchases
$130.5 billion; April 2009
(MBS)
Participants
FRBNY
Investment Managers
Custodian
Eligible Broker Dealers

Despite this significant action, the tightening of credit continued across markets, and on
November 25, 2008, the FOMC announced that it would purchase up to $500 billion in MBS
and $100 billion in debt from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and
the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). This intervention is often
called the first Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) program and was intended to reduce the
cost and increase the availability of mortgages, support housing markets, and foster
improved conditions in financial markets more generally. The purchases were implemented
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
In March 2009, the FOMC announced its intent to increase purchases to an additional $100
billion in agency debt and $750 billion in agency MBS (bringing the aggregate commitment
to $200 billion in debt and $1.25 trillion in MBS). The FRBNY also began purchasing $300
billion in longer-term Treasury securities as part of the program. In September 2009, the
FRBNY began to wind down purchases, as the most severe phase of the crisis had passed and
housing markets had stabilized somewhat. By the programs’ expiration, the Fed had
purchased $172.1 billion in agency debt, $1.25 trillion in agency MBS, and $300 billion in
Treasury securities. Over the next several years, the Fed allowed its debt portfolio to run off
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but continued to purchase agency MBS and Treasury securities under subsequent purchase
programs.
Summary Evaluation
The academic community generally concurs that the Fed’s purchases of agency debt and MBS
succeeded in lowering interest rates. Nonetheless, academics disagree about which interest
rates were impacted by these programs and to what extent. While most scholars identify
these programs as having a substantial positive impact, some have found the programs to be
much less effective in lowering longer-term interest rates.
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Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) Program: United States
Context
GDP
$14,681.5 billion in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
converted to USD)
$14,628.02 billion in 2009
GDP per capita
$47,976 in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$48,383 in 2008
converted to USD)
$47,100.00 in 2009
Sovereign credit rating (5-year
As of Q4 2007/2008/2009:
senior debt)
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
Size of banking system
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
$9789.07 billion in total assets in 2009
Size of banking system as a
62.9% in 2007
percentage of GDP
68.3% in 2008
66.92% in 2009
Size of banking system assets as a
29.0% in 2007
percentage of financial system
30.5% in 2008
assets
30.25% in 2009
5-bank concentration of banking
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
system
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
44.27% of total banking assets in 2009
Foreign involvement in banking
22% of total banking assets in 2007
system
18% of total banking assets in 2008
19% of total banking assets in 2009

Government ownership of banking
system
Existence of deposit insurance

0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in
2008
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in
2009
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
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I. Overview
Background
Beginning in mid-2007, default rates on subprime and nonprime mortgages spiked, causing
mortgage lending to slow and the value of mortgage securities to plummet (OFHEO 2008,
iii). Home prices also fell across the United States (OFHEO 2008, 7). By mid-2007, private
mortgage securitization began shrinking to minimal levels because of the housing correction
(OFHEO 2008, 7, 8). The impact of the strains in mortgage markets spilled over to other
markets as investors became increasingly concerned about the impact on financial firms,
particularly after the prominent French bank BNP Paribas announced that it was suspending
redemptions from two of its investment funds on August 9, 2007 (Wiggins and Metrick 2016,
35). The French bank declared that it could not value the funds because of the amount of
subprime loans both funds held in their portfolios (OFHEO 2008, 35). BNP Paribas’s
announcement led investors and institutions to pull funding from investments they saw as
risky, causing markets to contract even further (OFHEO 2008, 35). Many banks, governmentaffiliated financial agencies, and other firms began to experience funding difficulties because
of the contractions, which stemmed partially from their reliance on short-term sources of
funding, like securitization, repurchase agreements, and asset-backed commercial paper
(OFHEO 2008, 35).
Given the tightening of credit across markets, in September 2007 the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) lowered the target federal funds rate from 5.25% to 4.75% and the
discount rate from 5.75% to 5.25% (FOMC 2007). The FOMC’s decision to reduce the federal
funds rate reflected a shift from its previously existing policy of steadily increasing interest
rates from 2004 to 2006 (FRBG 2020). Markets continued to stagnate after September 2007:
home prices declined, subprime mortgage delinquencies rose, and rating agencies
downgraded mortgage-related securities (FCIC 2011, 213-223). In 2008, the FOMC lowered
the federal funds rate aggressively (most cuts were 50 or 75 basis points) during a wave of
bankruptcies and near-bankruptcies of major financial institutions (FRBG 2020; FCIC 2011,
280-291, 324-343) (see Figure 1). On December 16, 2008, the target range for the federal
funds rate was set between 0.25% and 0% (FOMC 2008c).

407

The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–Module F

Thompson and Kulam

Figure 1: Effective Federal Funds Rate

Note: Shaded areas indicate US recessions (according to the St. Louis Fed).
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve.
The GSEs and Their Financial Condition
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are publicly traded government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) authorized by congressional charter to operate in the secondary mortgage market to
support the residential mortgage market (Kosar 2007, 1-3; FHFA n.d.). The GSEs purchase
mortgages from originators, package those mortgages into mortgage-backed securities
(MBS), and retain some of the purchased mortgages in their investment portfolios, where
they could also hold their own MBS, non-agency MBS, and other types of fixed-income
securities (FHFA n.d.; FCIC 2011, 123-125). The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is
a collection of then-12 banks owned by their borrowers that use mortgages as collateral to
lend to institutions, mainly commercial banks and thrifts; the FHLBs are also GSEs (FHFA
2016, 6; Kosar 2007, 3, 4). The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) is a
government-owned entity that also operates in the secondary mortgage market (Ginnie Mae
2020; Ginnie Mae 2016).
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs experienced losses related to the financial crisis
and contractions in mortgage markets (FCIC 2011, 309, 310). Federal officials and the
market viewed losses and contractions to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the most impactful,
given the GSEs’ size, their critical condition, and the scope of the intervention required to
rescue them from insolvency (Dickerson 2008a; Dickerson 2008b).
The GSEs posed a systemic risk because of their size (Kosar 2007, 5, 6). By September 2008,
the GSEs collectively held or guaranteed $5.3 trillion in mortgages, or approximately half of
all outstanding mortgages (FCIC 2011, 309; FHFA 2011). Despite the government’s efforts to
mitigate concerns, the GSEs’ financial situation continued to deteriorate (FCIC 2011, 309323). On September 6 and 7, 2008, the government instituted a four-part rescue plan to
stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FCIC 2011, 320; Treasury 2008). The main element
of the plan was to take the two GSEs into government conservatorship, with funding from
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the Treasury guaranteeing their solvency (Treasury 2008).5 Another component of this plan
involved purchases of GSE MBS by Treasury (Treasury 2008). Treasury purchased $225
billion in GSE MBS by the time the program expired in December 2009 (Treasury 2012).
The government’s rescue of the GSEs in September 2008 guaranteed their solvency;
however, agency debt and MBS spreads remained high, and the housing market continued
to face severe stresses (FOMC 2008b). These factors, along with a dramatic reduction of the
federal funds rate by November 2008, led the government to consider implementing
nontraditional monetary policy measures that would stimulate the economy.
Program Description
On November 25, 2008, the FOMC announced that it would purchase MBS worth up to $500
billion from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (FRBG 2008). In addition, the Federal
Reserve pledged to purchase up to $100 billion of debt from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the FHLBs. This intervention is often called the first Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP)
program.6 The LSAP program aimed to “reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit
for the purchase of houses, which would support housing markets and foster improved
conditions in financial markets more generally.”
After additional consideration, the program was further defined and ratified by the FOMC at
its December 16, 2008, meeting. At this meeting, members decided not to purchase longerterm Treasury securities in addition to agency debt and MBS (however, it did begin to
purchase these in March 2009) (FOMC 2008c; FOMC 2009h). The FOMC also reduced its
target federal funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% (FOMC 2008c).
The Fed’s authority to conduct open market operations was granted under Section 14 of the
Federal Reserve Act. The FOMC tasked the FRBNY, which oversees the Fed’s Open Market
Operations, to purchase and hold agency debt and MBS in the System Open Market Account
(SOMA) portfolio (FOMC 2009b, 6-13). Large-scale purchases of GSE debt and MBS were not
a normal function of open market operations, although the FRBNY occasionally bought
agency debt (FOMC 2009b, 8-10).7 By law, the Fed could purchase only agency debt
securities, agency MBS, and Treasury securities (Bernanke 2017, 9). After consultation with
FOMC members, the Fed chairman originally authorized the LSAP program pursuant to his
standing authority to make adjustments to monetary policy between FOMC meetings (after
consultation with the Committee) contained in the Authorization for Domestic Open Market
Operations then in effect (FOMC 2009b, 9).

See the 2021 document by Wiggins et al., “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview,”
from the Journal of Financial Crises for a discussion of the overall rescue plan.
6 Other evaluators and federal officials have called these purchases quantitative easing (QE), or quantitative
easing 1, but, for the sake of clarity and consistency, the LSAP program is used herein.
7 The Federal Reserve began to purchase agency debt in 1971, ceased new purchases in 1981, and allowed all
agencies to roll off its balance sheet beginning in 1997 (Gagnon et al. 2011, 44). Afterward, the Federal Reserve
purchased only short-term agency debt from September 19–26, 2008, to “support market functioning” (FRBNY
n.d.).
5
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Generally, the LSAP program can be understood in three stages—initial, expansion, and wind
down—as shown in Figure 2. Debt purchases began within several weeks of the
announcement, as the Fed was more accustomed to conducting these transactions (FRBG
2008a; Bernanke 2017, 9) (see Appendix A). MBS purchases, which required additional
administrative preparation, began on January 5, 2009 (see Appendix B). The Fed added
purchases of longer-term Treasury securities in March 2009 (FOMC 2009h).

Figure 2: LSAP Program Timeline
Date

MBS

11/25/2008
Initial

Commitment: $500 billion
Expected end:
Unspecified; Several
quarters

12/16/2008
03/18/2009
Expansion

Debt

Commitment: $100 billion
Purchases start the second
week of December
Expected end: Unspecified;
Several quarters
FOMC decided not to purchase Treasury securities in addition to MBS and debt.
FRBNY began purchasing agency MBS on January 5, 2009.
Commitment: Additional
$750 billion (aggregate
$1.25 trillion)

03/24/2009
08/12/2009
Wind down

Announced End: First
quarter 2010

09/23/2009

Announcement: Gradually
slow the pace of purchases

Commitment: Additional
$100 billion (aggregate
$200 billion)

03/31/2010
08/10/2010

Commitment: $300
billion in longer-term
securities
Announced End:
October 2009

Announced End: End of
2009
Announced End: First
quarter 2010;
on-the-run debt accepted
after 08/31/2009
Announcement: Gradually
slow the pace of purchases

10/29/2009
11/04/2009

Treasury Securities

Purchases End;
Commitment used: $300
billion of $300 billion
Announced End: Reduced
from $200 billion to $175
billion
Purchases End;
Purchases End;
Commitment used: $1.25
Commitment used: $172.1
trillion of $1.25 trillion
billion of $175 billion
FOMC announces 1) that it will reinvest principle from agency debt and MBS
purchases into longer-term Treasury securities and 2) a rollover program of longerterm Treasury Securities (mainly 2- to 10-year).

Sources: FOMC Transcripts; FRBG Press Releases; FRBNY FAQs.
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Initial Phase
Across all three types of securities purchased—agency debt, MBS, and Treasury—the FRBNY
used modeled yield curves and fair values to determine which securities were underpriced
compared with securities in the entire sector (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). Based on this
determination, the FRBNY purchased those assets that it perceived to be underpriced
(Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). The FRBNY also varied its daily purchases of securities in order to
meet the FOMC’s targets and to account for fluctuations in the market (Gagnon et al. 2011,
45).
Agency Debt Purchases
Purchases of agency debt began in the second week of December 2008 and were set up as
multi-price reverse auctions (FRBNY 2010b). Eligible debt securities needed to be fixed rate,
noncallable, senior benchmark, and sold at competitive prices. The FRBNY accepted only offthe-run securities from the program’s outset until August 31, 2009 (off-the-run refers to a
security that is not the most recently issued). After August 31, the FRBNY also accepted onthe-run debt, provided that it met the aforementioned criteria.
The FRBNY set the minimum debt offer at $1 million, with increasing $1 million increments
(FRBNY 2010b). The auctions were conducted via FedTrade, which is the Fed’s trading
system. Dealers were permitted to make up to three propositions each auction period, which
typically lasted for 30 minutes. While the Fed aimed to purchase longer-term debt securities,
most debt purchases were medium-term securities because fewer longer-term securities
were available (see Figure 3) (Gagnon et al. 2011, 46). The FRBNY created additional bank
reserves to finance these purchases (FRBNY 2010b). The FRBNY generally held auctions to
purchase GSE debt once a week, which it announced one day prior to the auction.
Figure 3: Distribution of Agency Debt Purchases by Maturity

Sources: Gagnon et al. 2011, 46; original data from FRBNY.
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Agency MBS Purchases
Purchases of agency MBS began on January 5, 2009 (FRBNY 2018). MBS purchases posed a
serious operational challenge for the FRBNY, “owing to the complex nature and
heterogeneity of these securities and to the scale of the MBS purchase program” (Gagnon et
al. 2011, 44). Although the FRBNY accepted some agency MBS as collateral in repurchase
agreement transactions before 2009, it previously had never purchased agency MBS directly
(Gagnon et al. 2011, 44).
Given the complications with conducting MBS purchases, the FRBNY selected four
investment managers and a custodian to help facilitate the program (FRBNY 2010a). The
FRBNY selected BlackRock, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, PIMCO, and Wellington
Management (Wellington) to serve as investment managers, based on their operational
capacity, size, competitive fee structure, and knowledge of the MBS market. The FRBNY
chose JPMorgan Chase to be the program custodian, which was also tasked to provide fund
accounting and administrative services.
The four investment managers handled most of the trading operations during the first
several months of the program. In August 2009, the FRBNY began to phase out the
investment managers, as the FRBNY staff developed the expertise to carry out purchases on
their own.
On August 17, 2009, the FRBNY announced its reduction of investment managers from four
to two: Wellington was retained for trading, settlement, and secondary risk and analytics
support (FRBNY 2009d; FRBNY 2010a; Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). BlackRock was retained for
primary risk and analytics support services (FRBNY 2009d). Beginning on March 2, 2010,
the FRBNY relied on internal staff to execute MBS purchases and alternated with Wellington
every other trading day (FRBNY 2010a). By the end of the program, FRBNY had assumed full
trading responsibilities (FRBNY 2010a).
Unlike agency debt purchases, which were conducted via auction, the FRBNY and its
managers purchased MBS directly from primary dealers (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). By March
2009, the FOMC decided to supplement its MBS transactions with dollar rolls (FOMC 2009c,
6; FRBNY 2010a). A dollar roll is similar to a reverse repurchase agreement, and the Fed used
dollar rolls to defer the settlement of existing trades (FRBNY 2010a). The FRBNY purchased
MBS at market prices from eligible primary dealers. When the counterparties had difficulties
obtaining the securities to deliver to the FRBNY, the Fed dollar rolled the transaction—for a
fee—into the next settlement cycle. The FRNBY bought MBS at a variety of settlement dates
that ranged from one calendar week to three calendar months (FRBG 2016).
MBS needed to be fixed rate in order to be eligible (FRBNY 2009b). To best align with the
program’s goals, the composition of MBS purchases tended toward longer maturity or longer
duration securities to target longer-term interest rates, as 95% of MBS purchased had a 30year maturity (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45; FRBG 2016). By concentrating purchases on newly
issued 30-year securities (“production” MBS), the FRBNY created demand for new loans,
which aimed to reduce primary mortgage rates (Gagnon et al. 2011, 46). However, the
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FRBNY also purchased 15-year and 20-year securities to reduce potential distortions in yield
curves (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45).
The FRBNY purchased enough MBS to meet the FOMC’s targets, while also compensating for
day-to-day variation in market liquidity conditions (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45-46). Nonetheless,
the FRBNY avoided buying at excessively high prices (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45 ).
Expansion of Commitment
By March 2009, the FRBNY had purchased about 35.7% of its debt commitment and 30% of
its MBS commitment (FHFA Market Data; see Appendixes A and B). Though FRBNY used a
substantial amount of its commitment, housing markets and the broader economy continued
to contract (FOMC 2009h). On March 18, 2009, the FOMC announced that it would purchase
an additional $100 billion in debt and $750 billion in MBS, bringing its aggregate
commitments to $200 billion in debt and $1.25 trillion in MBS (FOMC 2009h).
Treasury Securities
While it increased its commitment for agency debt and MBS, in March 2009, the FOMC also
pledged to buy $300 billion in longer-term Treasury securities to improve conditions in
private credit markets (FOMC 2009h). The program targeted older Treasury securities, as
the market was reluctant to buy them (Gagnon et al. 2011, 43). Older Treasury securities are
less liquid, which made them much more difficult to sell under the market conditions at the
time (Gagnon et al. 2011, 43). As a result, older securities had become quite cheap in
comparison to newer Treasury securities (Gagnon et al. 2011, 43). The Fed planned to
purchase $300 billion worth of Treasury securities in six months (FOMC 2009c, 219-221).
Wind-Down Phase
By August 2009, the most severe phase of the crisis had passed, and housing markets had
stabilized somewhat (FOMC 2009a). To phase out the LSAP program with minimal
disruption to the market, in its meeting on August 12, 2009, the FOMC voted to gradually
scale down Treasury purchases. The Fed announced its intention to gradually slow the pace
of agency debt and MBS purchases on September 23, 2009, and FRBNY extended the
tentative termination of agency debt and MBS purchases to the end of first quarter 2010
(FRBNY 2018).
The Fed completed purchases of $300 billion in Treasury securities on October 29, 2009
(FRBNY 2018).
On November 4, 2009, the Fed reduced the aggregate commitment for agency debt
purchases from $200 billion to $175 billion, citing a lack of available agency debt (FOMC
2009i).
Beginning in the first quarter of 2010, the Fed slowed purchases to once every two weeks
(FRBNY 2010b). At its March meeting, the FOMC voted to end the LSAP program, which
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terminated purchases on March 31, 2010, although it continued to use dollar rolls to settle
outstanding transactions after that date (FOMC 2010a; FRBNY 2010a).
The FOMC permitted agency debt and MBS to run off its balance sheet between March 31
and August 2010 (English 2020). At the August 10, 2010, meeting, the FOMC voted to
reinvest the principal payments from agency debt and MBS into longer-term Treasury
securities (FOMC 2010d, 8). Providing reasons for the reinvestment, the FOMC stated, “In
light of current conditions in the MBS market and the Committee’s desire to normalize the
composition of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio, it would be better to reinvest in longer-term
Treasury securities than in MBS” but noted that “reinvesting in MBS might become desirable
if conditions were to change” (FOMC 2010d, 8).
Outcomes
Between the program’s announcement on November 25, 2008, and its conclusion on March
31, 2010, the FRBNY purchased $172.1 billion in agency debt, $1.25 trillion in agency MBS,
and $300 billion in Treasury securities, or roughly 22% of available securities in these three
categories (Gagnon et al. 2011, 44). The magnitude of this program led Gagnon et al. to
conclude that “no investor—public or private—has ever accumulated such a large amount
of securities in such a short period of time” (Gagnon et al. 2011, 44). Nine percent of the
agency MBS purchases were from Ginnie Mae, while the rest were from the GSEs (FHFA
2019) (see Appendix B).
Agency Debt Purchases
As evidenced in Figure 4, agency debt purchases did not have a single peak. There seemed to
be three instances of increased debt purchases: directly following the announcement to
purchase debt in November 2008, during the expansion of the commitment in March 2009,
and in October 2009, the final month of the Fed’s program to purchase $300 billion in
Treasury securities and the month before it reduced its debt commitment from $200 billion
to $175 billion. As seen in Figure 4, the FRBNY began to wind down operations in the fall of
2009 and into the spring of 2010. The FRBNY’s largest series of agency debt purchases in a
single month was $16.9 billion in March 2009 (FHFA 2019) (see Appendix A). Approximately
22% of the FRBNY’s agency debt purchases were directed at the FHLBs, while the rest of the
debt was purchased from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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Figure 4: Federal Reserve’s Monthly Purchases of Agency Debt (in billions of USD)
$18.00
$16.00
$14.00
$12.00
$10.00
$8.00
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$-

Freddie Mac

Fannie Mae

Ginnie Mae

Total

Source: FHFA, “Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and MortgageRelated Securities.”
MBS Purchases
It is difficult to overstate the size and scope of the FRBNY’s MBS purchase program. As shown
in Figure 5, the FRBNY’s $1.25 trillion MBS program dwarfed Treasury’s $220.8 billion MBS
program. The Fed’s purchase of MBS peaked in the spring of 2009, increasing after the
expansion of its commitment in March 2009. The largest series of agency MBS purchases in
a single week was $33.3 billion during March 19-25, 2009, contributing to the largest series
of agency MBS purchases in a single month at $136.8 billion (week of February 26-March 25,
2009) (FHFA 2019) (see Appendix B).
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Figure 5: FRBNY and Treasury Purchases of Agency MBS (in billions of USD)
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Source: FHFA, “Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and MortgageRelated Securities.”
Treasury Purchases
The Fed conducted 60 purchases of Treasury securities for an aggregate $300 billion,
tapering purchases before it closed the program at the end of October 2009 (see Figures 6
and 7) (FOMC 2009e). The largest weekly purchases appear to have taken place in April
2009.
Figure 6: Federal Reserve’s Weekly Treasury Purchases

Sources: FOMC presentation materials from the meeting on November 3-4, 2009; original data
from FRBNY.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Treasury Securities Purchases by Maturity

Sources: FOMC presentation materials from the meeting on November 3-4, 2009; original data
from FRBNY.
The Fed’s Balance Sheet
The LSAP program substantially expanded the Fed’s balance sheet, which contained about
$1 trillion of assets in September 2008 and $2.3 trillion in January 2010 (FOMC 2010c, 2). In
August 2010, the FOMC voted to limit holdings of domestic assets in the SOMA portfolio to
$2 trillion (FOMC 2010d, 9, 10). In the case of agency debt, the expansion of the Fed’s balance
sheet by approximately $180 billion was more temporary, as it reduced its debt holdings
beginning in 2010 (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Federal Agency Debt Securities Held by the Federal Reserve

Note: US recessions are shaded; the end date of the most recent recession is undetermined.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; FRBG.
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As Figure 9 shows, the impact of agency MBS on the Fed’s balance sheet was more lasting
than that of agency debt because the Fed continued to purchase and roll over MBS in
subsequent purchase programs.
Figure 9: Mortgage-Backed Securities Held by the Federal Reserve

Note: US recessions are shaded; the end date of the most recent recession is undetermined.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; FRBG.
In the case of Treasury securities, the Fed’s holdings continued to increase rather than
decrease after 2009, as it implemented several new purchasing programs over the next few
years (Mendez-Carbajo 2020) (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: US Treasury Securities Held by the Federal Reserve

Note: US recessions are shaded; the end date of the most recent recession is undetermined.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; FRBG.
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II. Key Design Decisions
1. The LSAP program was a nontraditional macroeconomic policy measure enacted
in conjunction with reductions in policy interest rates.
The Fed had reduced the federal funds and discount rates since September 2007 (FRBG
2020). By November 2008, the crisis was far from over, and the federal funds rate was
approaching the zero lower bound (FOMC 2008a, 22-23). The FOMC thus sought to
develop and implement other nontraditional monetary policy measures to increase the
availability of credit and reduce borrowing rates, thereby stimulating and bolstering the
financial system (FOMC 2008a, 22-30; FRBG 2008).
On November 25, 2008, after discussions by FOMC participants, the Board of Governors
announced the decision to purchase agency debt and MBS (FRBG 2008; English 2020). At
the following FOMC meeting in mid-December 2008, officials discussed three
nontraditional strategies—“simple” quantitative easing, purchasing longer-term
securities, and creating or expanding special liquidity and lending facilities (FOMC 2008a,
17-18). The LSAP program fell into the second category, purchasing longer-term
securities.
Nonetheless, the three strategies discussed in December 2008 may provide insight into
the Fed’s implementation of the LSAPs as a nontraditional policy measure. Officials did
not consider seriously purchasing private securities, as they believed this move would
take them even further in the direction of credit allocation, which would result in more
longer-term costs than benefits (FOMC 2008a, 34, 57, 71). The full list of benefits and
drawbacks of all three approaches outlined in the December meeting can be found in
Appendix C. While there was some uncertainty regarding the program’s size, FOMC
members understood that the Fed would need to buy a substantial quantity of securities
to give the intervention a chance of success (FOMC 2008a, 63-66). The FOMC’s directive
gave FRBNY the authority to purchase up to $100 billion in housing-related GSE debt and
up to $500 billion in agency MBS by the second quarter of 2009 (FOMC 2008b, 10). The
directive also allowed the FRBNY’s Open Market Desk to determine the precise timing of
the purchases (FOMC 2008b, 10).

2. The FOMC decided that the LSAP program would at first include only purchases of
agency debt and MBS, not Treasury securities.
Having already enacted the LSAP program, FOMC officials deliberated between
purchasing agency debt and MBS alone or in conjunction with purchasing longer-term
Treasury securities and decided to delay purchases of Treasuries (FOMC 2008a).
The FOMC saw advantages to purchasing agency debt and MBS over purchasing any
Treasury securities for the following reasons:
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•

It would remove assets from the market (debt, MBS) that were lower in demand
compared to Treasury securities (Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 140)

•

Fed analysts concluded that debt and MBS purchases would result in a more rapid
recovery of GDP growth than dollar-for-dollar purchases of Treasury securities
(Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 140-141).

•

It would complement housing refinance activities better than purchases of
Treasury securities (Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 141).

•

It was easier to explain the rationale for purchasing debt and MBS to the public
(Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 140).

•

Treasury spreads had already fallen, while private yields had not fallen (breaking
a trend) (FOMC 2008a, 57). Several FOMC officials concluded that lowering
Treasury yields, which were already low, likely would not have an effect on other
yields (FOMC 2008a, 21, 57). By contrast, yields on agency MBS remained high.

The main drawback voiced about the purchase of agency debt and MBS was:
•

The FOMC believed that purchasing of agency debt and MBS could be seen as
credit allocation, or, in their words, “steering funds to the GSEs and to particular
economic sectors” (FOMC 2008a, 21).

A secondary goal of the LSAP program may have been to augment the Treasury’s MBS
purchase program for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which some market analysts
believed had been too limited and insufficiently transparent (Collins 2008, 19). The
secondary goal of this program needs to be considered carefully, in light of the concern
expressed by some Fed officials that purchases of longer-term securities through the
LSAP program might be seen as credit allocation toward the GSEs and the secondary
mortgage market (FOMC 2008a, 34, 57, 71).
3. Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act provided the legal authority for the LSAP
program.
Treasuries. The Fed’s purchases of Treasury securities were authorized under Section
14(2)(b)(1) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA), which allows the Fed to buy and sell direct
from Treasury (1) “bonds and notes of the Unites States with maturities not exceeding
six months,” and (2) “bonds and notes, or other obligations which are direct obligations
of the United States or which are fully guaranteed by the United States as to the principal
and interest” of any maturity “but only in the open market.”
Agency MBS and debt. Section 14(2)(b)(2) of the FRA permits the Fed “[t]o buy and sell
in the open market [ . . . ] any obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaranteed
as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States.” Although the GSEs
(Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks) are not government
agencies but government instrumentalities, their Congressional charters and other
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federal regulations afford them certain special privileges (Reiss 2008, 1053-61). One of
these privileges is that the Federal Reserve is required by statute to act as their fiscal
agent, a role that the Fed primarily plays for the federal government (Reiss 2008, 106061). Another privilege is that many federal regulations permit banks and other entities
to treat their obligations as similar to Treasuries and other direct government obligations
(Reiss 2008, 1061). In similar fashion, the Federal Reserve has long treated agency debt
and securities as “principal agency obligations eligible as collateral for advances” from
its discount window and as “direct obligations of, and obligations fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by, any agency of the United States . . . eligible for purchase by
Reserve Banks” pursuant to Section 14(b). This was the authority relied on for the agency
debt and MBS purchases under the LSAP.8
Reflecting on the LSAP program, Chairman Ben Bernanke noted:
Probably the most controversial form of unconventional policy adopted in recent
years was what the Federal Reserve called large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) but
most of the rest of the world persisted in calling “quantitative easing,” or QE [ . . . ] By
law, the Fed was able to purchase only Treasury securities and mortgage-related
securities issued by government-sponsored enterprises. Other central banks, in
contrast, have been able to buy a range of private securities, including corporate bonds
and equities. The limits on the Fed did not seem to prevent its version of QE from being
effective, although it was perhaps fortunate that, following a crisis centered on housing
finance, the law did permit Fed purchases of mortgage-related securities (Bernanke
2017, 9).
4. The Fed opted to commit a substantial amount of reserves to purchase agency
debt and MBS with a flexible timeline.
Given the perceived advantages of purchasing agency debt and MBS, analysts at the Fed
identified two approaches that the FRBNY could have taken related to the timing and size
of its LSAP program (Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 142).
Approach A—Announcing a volume of purchases over a certain time period
Advantages included:
•

The Fed could have better control over the size of its balance sheet.

•

It resulted in less active trading of the Fed’s portfolio.

See regulation 12 CFR § 201.108, which interprets FRA Section 14(b) to encompass debt and securities of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, cited in Reiss 2008 at page 1062, footnote 197.
See also Arthur L. Broida’s 1971 letter to the Federal Open Market Committee, which further explores agency
issues in the context of open market operations.
8
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•

It would be easier to achieve a balance of purchases across different market
segments (possibly through an index replication strategy).

•

The Fed did not have to assume full responsibility for the price of the
securities.

Approach B—Establishing a ceiling for conventional fixed mortgage rates. For example, the
Fed could announce that it would purchase all newly issued agency MBS with a certain
coupon at par.
Advantages included:
•

It would more clearly outline the Fed’s policy.

•

The general public would understand it better.

The Fed’s decision to commit a substantial amount of reserves with a flexible timeline
was a blend of these two strategies (Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 143). With respect to the
first strategy, the FOMC announced an explicit commitment amount (Gagnon and
Holscher 2008, 143). With respect to the second approach, the FOMC described this
commitment as a ceiling, implying that it would not necessarily purchase the full amount
of its commitment (Gagnon and Holscher 2008, 143). FOMC members seem to have
recognized that establishing an upper limit could pose such a risk, given its debates over
the limit and its decision to include the phrase “up to” in its agency debt and MBS
announcements (FOMC 2008a, 79).
The Fed published a press release on November 25, 2008, that communicated its decision
to purchase up to $100 billion in GSE direct obligations and $500 billion in MBS in
competitive auctions. In the same announcement, the Fed clarified its expectation for the
purchases to occur “over several quarters” and did not describe the per-month path of
asset purchases.
In March 2009, several members of the FOMC proposed an alternative to establishing an
upper limit (FOMC 2009c, 78-80, 181). They argued that the Fed should announce its
intention to increase the size of its balance sheet on a month-to-month basis, without
specifying the total (FOMC 2009c, 78-80, 181). According to these members, a balancesheet approach would allow the FRBNY to adjust its ongoing purchases of MBS, debt, and
Treasury securities to reflect current economic conditions, since none of these assets
would have a fixed limit (FOMC 2009c, 78-80). The balance sheet approach was not
implemented.
5. Only primary dealers could participate in the program.
The Fed’s designated primary dealers were the only institutions allowed to transact in
any of the three securities of the LSAP program as broker dealers from whom the
investment managers could purchase securities (FRBNY 2008d, 4, 28; FRBNY 2010b).
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6. The FRBNY initially used investment managers but later phased them out as it
began to control trading operations more directly.
Given the size of the commitment and the FRBNY’s lack of experience in MBS purchases,
FRBNY selected four investment managers and a custodian after the program’s
announcement (FRBG 2008; FRBNY 2008a). The FRBNY chose BlackRock, Goldman
Sachs Asset Management, PIMCO, and Wellington Management to serve as investment
managers, based on their operational capacity, size, competitive fee structure, and
knowledge of the MBS market (FRBNY 2008a). The FRBNY selected JPMorgan Chase
(JPMC) to be the program’s custodian and also tasked it with providing fund accounting
and administrative services (FRBNY 2008b, 1, 26; FRBNY 2010a).
The investment managers entered into nearly identical agreements with the FRBNY, and
became responsible for purchasing agency MBS and exercising tangential rights (such as
proxy rights or warrants) under the securities, in accordance with FRBNY investment
guidance and objectives and on its behalf (FRBNY 2008d, 1-2; FRBNY 2008c, 1-2; FRBNY
2008f, 1-2; FRBNY 2008e, 1-2). FRBNY authorized investment managers to buy and sell
agency MBS on the Fed’s behalf via the Fed’s System Open Market Account (SOMA)
(FRBNY 2008d, 1-3). Transactions were to be communicated to and settled by the
custodian (FRBNY 2008d, 3-4).
The investment managers had the sole right to determine the broker dealer for trades
from a list approved by the FRBNY and to establish the rate for execution services
(FRBNY 2008d, 4). Upon request, managers were required to both offer advice related to
residential loan modification and to provide assistance to influence residential loan
modification and policies of residential mortgage-backed loans tied to agency MBS
(FRBNY 2008d, 2). In addition, managers were obligated to provide the FRBNY with
monthly reports, submit weekly market updates to the FRBNY and the custodian, and
meet with FRBNY representatives each month (FRBNY 2008d, 4-6).
Each manager was paid a fee calculated monthly and paid quarterly “based on the
average quarterly notional value of the Agency MBS” in the LSAP portfolio from all
investment managers (based on the records of the Custodian) 9 (FRBNY 2008d, Exhibit
D). The quarterly fee rate was “1/16th of the annual rate of 1.25 basis points” (FRBNY
2008d, Exhibit D).
On August 17, 2009, the FRBNY announced that it would end its contracts with PIMCO
and Goldman Sachs Asset Management (FRBNY 2009d; Gagnon et al. 2011, 45).
Wellington Management Company would be retained as the sole investment manager
and BlackRock would be retained to provide analytical support services (Gagnon et al.
2011, 45). The external investment managers were phased out because FRBNY

The agreement provided that “notional amount shall mean the Current Face amount of the Agency MBS,
including unsettled Trades and TBA's and not to be reduced by the unsettled Current Face sold as part of dollar
roll transactions” (FRBNY-GS Agreement, Exhibit D).
9

423

The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–Module F

Thompson and Kulam

developed its own “internal analytical and operational expertise” during the program and
wished to reduce costs (FRBNY 2009f).
Under the new contract, Wellington retained the same rights and obligations to the
FRBNY. From September 15, 2009, until the program’s termination in March 2010,
Wellington was paid a flat fee of $1.3 million per month (FRBNY 2009c, Exhibit D; FRBNY
2018). As a provider of analytical services, BlackRock would provide to the custodian and
the FRBNY: reports on the portfolio and compliance, client data, and access to analytical
tools. BlackRock’s fee was $330,000 a month, paid quarterly (FRBNY 2009a, 13).
Beginning on March 2, 2010, the FRBNY began to use internal staff to partially execute
MBS purchases and had assumed full trading responsibilities by the end of the program
(FRBNY 2010a).
7. The FRBNY hired JPMorgan Chase to serve as the custodian.
On December 31, 2008, the FRBNY entered into a contract with JPMorgan Chase (JPMC)
whereby JPMC would serve as the LSAP program’s sole custodian (FRBNY 2008b, 1).
Under the contract, JPMC was obligated to create accounts in the FRBNY’s name, one to
hold assets and one to hold cash (FRBNY 2008b, 2-3). More accounts could be created at
FRBNY’s request (FRBNY 2008b, 3). In accordance with instructions from the FRBNY,
JPMC would credit or debit the accounts as needed to facilitate and settle trades
conducted by FRBNY under the LSAP program (FRBNY 2008b, 3-4). Settlement was to be
in accordance with market standards (FRBNY 2008b, 5).
JPMC was also obligated to present assets to the FRBNY either at maturity or, at FRBNY’s
request, before maturity, along with regular information and statements on the account
(FRBNY 2008b, 4-5). JPMC was compensated per negotiated fees and reimbursement of
any out-of-pocket expenses (legal fees, tax fees, etc.) related to the LSAP program (FRBNY
2008b, 7-8).
8. Eligible agency debt securities needed to be fixed-rate, noncallable, senior
benchmark, at competitive prices, and off-the-run.
Agency debt securities needed to be fixed-rate, noncallable, senior benchmark, at
competitive prices, and off-the-run (FRBNY 2010b). In August 2010, the FRBNY also
allowed on-the-run debt (on-the-run refers to a security that has been most recently
issued) (FRBNY 2010b). The FRBNY allowed on-the-run securities in August 2010
because liquidity had improved and spreads relative to on-the-run securities had fallen
(Gagnon et al. 2011, 46). The FRBNY also permitted on-the-run securities in order to
reduce market dislocations that had resulted from the MBS purchase program (Gagnon
et al. 2011, 46).
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9. The FRBNY conducted debt purchases using multi-price reverse auctions and
announced auctions the day before.
The FRBNY set the minimum debt offer at $1 million, with increasing $1 million
increments (FRBNY 2010b). The auctions were conducted via FedTrade, which is the
Fed’s trading system (FRBNY 2010b). Dealers were permitted to make up to three
propositions each auction period, which typically lasted for 30 minutes (FRBNY 2010b).
While the Fed aimed to purchase longer-term debt securities, most debt purchases were
medium-term securities (with maturities of 2 to 5 years) because few longer-term
securities were available (see Figure 3) (Gagnon et al. 2011, 46). The FRBNY created
additional bank reserves to finance these purchases (FRBNY 2010b). The FRBNY
generally held auctions to purchase GSE debt once a week, which it announced one day
prior to the auction (FRBNY 2010b).
The FRBNY purchased agency debt and Treasuries through multi-price reverse auctions
and bought MBS directly with the assistance of asset managers (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45).
Multi-price reverse auctions of agency debt allowed primary dealer counterparties to
indicate the quantities and prices at which they were willing to sell, so the FRBNY
purchased the securities at the prices submitted by sellers (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). This
meant that potential investors competed for bids (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). FRBNY also
announced its Treasury and agency debt operations ahead of time by two weeks and one
day, respectively (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45). Gagnon et al. also note that the announcements
increased participation in the auctions, as they gave dealers time to appraise their
inventories (Gagnon et al. 2011, 45).
10. The composition of MBS purchases was tilted toward “production” MBS (newly
issued 30-year securities) in the TBA market.
FRBNY concentrated MBS purchases on newly issued, 30-year securities (so-called
“production” MBS) (Gagnon et al. 2011, 46). The Fed aimed to decrease primary
mortgage rates by supporting the market for new loans (Gagnon et al. 2011, 46).
Production MBS generally paid lower coupons than seasoned MBS because of then-low
interest rates, so all of FRBNY’s MBS purchases paid coupon rates between 3.5% and
6.5% (Gagnon et al. 2011, 46; FRBG 2016). The FOMC also focused purchases on the tobe-announced (TBA) market, where MBS trade weeks or months before delivery,
because it offered greater flexibility (FOMC 2009c, 26). Purchasing MBS in the TBA
market allowed the FRBNY to respond to daily changes in the market as it could buy
more, buy less, or use dollar rolls (Gagnon et al. 2011, 26).
11. The FRBNY purchased agency MBS outright beginning in January 2009, added
dollar rolls in March 2009, and added coupon swaps in June 2010.
By March 2009, settlement pressures emerged in the MBS market, so the FOMC used
dollar rolls to mitigate temporary imbalances related to the supply and demand of
specific coupon categories of MBS (FOMC 2009c; Gagnon et al. 2011, 46). A dollar roll is
a repurchase agreement with a settlement date ranging from one calendar week to three
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calendar months for agency MBS purchases (FRBG 2016). FRBNY conducted dollar rolls
with primary dealers by simultaneously purchasing/selling MBS for delivery in one
month and selling/purchasing a similar security for delivery in the next month (FRBNY
2010a). After the Fed began using dollar rolls in the first week of March 2009, the forward
financing rate for MBS dropped 100 bps compared with the MBS cash repo rate (FOMC
2009c, 6). The Fed began using dollar rolls to purchase high-coupon, seasoned MBS
because their liquidity was the most affected (FOMC 2009d, 125). According to the FOMC,
dollar roll transactions reduced the costs of managing mortgage inventory and helped
lower forward financing spreads (FOMC 2009c, 6).
In June 2010, the FRBNY began using coupon swaps in addition to dollar rolls to settle
transactions (FRBNY 2010a). FRBNY conducted coupon swaps with primary dealers by
simultaneously purchasing/selling one MBS security and selling/purchasing another
MBS security with a different coupon rate (FRBNY 2010a). Coupon swaps permitted
FRBNY to exchange assets that were not ready for settlement for assets that were ready.
Dollar rolls and coupon swaps did not change the aggregate purchase amounts but
allowed the Fed to fine-tune the timing and composition of security settlement (FRBNY
2010a).
12. In March 2009, the FOMC expanded the LSAP program, raising agency debt
purchases to $200 billion and MBS purchases to $1.25 trillion. The FOMC also
committed to buying up to $300 billion in longer-term Treasury securities.
Agency Securities. In March 2009, the FOMC decided to expand its purchases of debt and
MBS because FOMC officials estimated that the hole in the demand for agency securities
was still quite large (FOMC 2009f, 8). Some members argued that the market expected
the Fed to extend purchases of the agency MBS at the same purchase pace of at least $500
billion every six months (FOMC 2009c, 73). The FOMC decided to increase MBS
purchases by $750 billion (to an aggregate $1.25 trillion) to further support mortgage
lending and housing markets. At least one FOMC member felt that the purchases of
agency debt had not been effective but suggested that failing to increase the FOMC’s
commitment to purchase debt could cause more problems than what it would solve
(FOMC 2009c, 73).
Treasury Securities. Concurrent with the expansion in agency debt and MBS limits, the
FOMC also decided to purchase $300 billion in longer-term Treasury securities (FOMC
2009h). FOMC officials noted the macroeconomics effects that resulted from the Bank of
England’s (BoE) decision on March 5, 2009, to purchase longer-term Treasury securities
(FOMC 2009c, 5-6). FOMC officials and staff observed the effects of BoE’s gilt purchases
on public-sector and private-sector long-term yields (FOMC 2009c, 5-6; Gagnon et al.
2009, 5). Many officials also expressed less concern with the adverse effects of
purchasing Treasury securities than in December 2008, such as creating the perception
that the Federal Reserve was monetizing federal debt, which in turn could have adverse
effects on term premiums and inflation (FOMC 2009c, 90, 92-94, 96, 176, 208). Some
FOMC staff expressed concern that the continued purchases of agency debt and MBS
could decrease the benefit of purchasing these securities to the point that Treasury
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securities would become more beneficial (Gagnon et al. 2009, 2). FOMC officials also
suggested that the Treasury securities portfolio would be easier to wind down and sell
off than the agency securities (FOMC 2009c, 90, 92, 170-171). It was also noted that given
the “high degree of uncertainty” that had resulted from the Fed’s different policies since
the beginning of the crisis “it [would] be prudent to consider including a significant share
of Treasury securities in any further expansion of purchases” (Gagnon et al. 2009, 2).
The FOMC wound down the Treasury purchases months before it terminated its
purchases of agency debt and MBS (FRBNY 2018; see Figure 2). The FOMC announced
and gradually reduced its purchases of agency debt and MBS to avoid raising market
interest rates (FOMC 2009j, 153-154). Gagnon et al. note that the FOMC was successful
with its wind-down strategy, as the termination of the LSAP program did not raise
interest rates by any noticeable amount (2011, 57).
13. The FOMC attempted to make the LSAP program very transparent.
One FOMC official suggested that the Fed needed to be transparent about the LSAP
program (and quantitative easing more generally) to reassure markets that the Fed had
intentionally entered into a new monetary policy regime and that it still was in control of
monetary policy (FOMC 2008a, 135-136, 191). The FOMC’s aim for more public
transparency emerged in direct response to reports from several prominent media
outlets in January 2009, which described the purchase programs as both unprecedented
and unclear (FOMC 2009b, 37-38). Given these concerns, the FOMC established a
Transparency Committee to consider ways to enhance the transparency of its policies.
This workgroup was tasked with assessing the public information on all the FRBNY’s
major rescue programs (FOMC 2009b, 37-38; FOMC 2009g, 9-10).
The FRBNY also attempted to make the LSAP programs transparent by announcing
auction dates and changes to the programs beforehand. Gagnon et al. asserted that “the
timely release of information was provided in order to reduce uncertainty and
speculation about operational details. This information may also have helped to prevent
erratic trading based on differential access to information or on rumors and
misconceptions” (2011, 47). In particular, Gagnon et al. find that the FRBNY’s
announcement of the program and subsequent announcements of changes to the
program directly lowered longer-term interest rates (2011, 48-52).
In addition to the transparency measures directly related to the programs, the FRBNY
continued to assure investors that it could raise short-term interest rates at any time
(Gagnon et al. 2011, 42).

III. Evaluation
Several weeks after the LSAP program’s inception, FOMC committee members noted that
announcing the program substantially narrowed the spreads between conforming
mortgages and Treasuries, causing conforming mortgage rates to fall substantially (FOMC

427

The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–Module F

Thompson and Kulam

2008a, 7). Central bankers and economists have argued that the size of the program’s
commitments played an integral role in lowering Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s debt
spreads and in lowering interest rates—particularly longer-term interest rates—more
broadly.
The academic community generally agrees that the Fed’s purchases of agency debt, MBS, and
Treasury securities succeeded in the Fed’s goal of lowering longer-term interest rates. They
also note that the program lowered debt spreads. Nonetheless, researchers disagree about
which interest rates were affected by these programs and to what extent. While some
analysts identify these programs as having a substantial impact on mortgage rates, others
have found the programs to be much less effective in lowering mortgage rates.
Gagnon et al. argue that the LSAP program succeeded in lowering longer-term interest rates,
including: two-year and 10-year Treasury yields, 10-year agency debt yields, current-coupon
30-year agency MBS yields, the 10-year Treasury term premium,10 the 10-year swap rate,
and the Baa corporate bond index yield (2011, 48-52). Gagnon et al. also argue that the
programs had a more direct impact on lowering agency debt and MBS interest rates, which
also improved market liquidity (2011, 57). Neely’s results align with the findings of Gagnon
et al.: the Fed’s announcements to purchase agency debt and MBS lowered yields and interest
rates for US and foreign bonds (Neely 2011, 27-29).
Using event study methodology of the program’s announcements, Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen also find that the LSAP program lowered MBS yields (2011, 35-37). They
also assert that the LSAP program succeeded in lowering corporate yields (possibly by
lowering corporate credit risk) (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011, 3, 20). As noted
by Gagnon et al. (2011, 16), D’Amico and King (2010) conclude that the yields on Treasury
securities purchased under the LSAP program fell more than the yields on securities that
were not purchased by the program. The authors also argue that the LSAP program
significantly reduced medium- and longer-term Treasury yields (D’Amico and King 2010).
After conducting an empirical analysis of the Treasury and Fed MBS purchase programs,
however, Stroebel and Taylor conclude that government interventions did not have a major
impact on lowering mortgage rates (2012, 38-40). Instead, they posit that changes in
prepayment risk and default risk mainly drove the decline in rates (38-40).
In contrast to Stroebel and Taylor, a 2014 report issued by the Office of the Inspector General
of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA OIG) found that the LSAP program had a direct
impact on lowering mortgage rates, which contributed to increased rates of housing
refinance (14-17). Lowered mortgage rates also directly improved the GSEs’ financial
condition, as these lowered rates led to an increase in housing refinance activity (FHFA OIG
2014, 16). In 2012 and 2013, the GSEs particularly began to benefit from an increase in

The term premium is the additional return investors demand to hold a Treasury security with a longer
duration (Gagnon et al. 2011, 42). They attribute this fall in the premium to the “portfolio-balance effect,” under
which purchases of Treasury securities raise the price of a security and lower its term premium ( 42).
10
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housing refinances after their regulator raised the GSEs’ guarantee fees on MBS (FHFA OIG
2014, 18-19).
From an operational standpoint, Gagnon et al. highlight the potential pitfalls of announcing
a commitment amount (particularly if that commitment is large) (2011, 57). They argue that
stating a commitment could cause market participants to expect the FRBNY to purchase the
entire amount, irrespective of market conditions (Gagnon et al. 2011, 57). While Gagnon et
al. recognize the potential benefits of clearly articulating commitment size to the market (for
more see KDD 4), they note that “policymakers often prefer not to make strong commitments
on future policies because there is always a chance that future economic conditions will call
for a different policy stance than expected” (Gagnon et al. 2011, 57).
Finally, Kohn and Sack (2018), who took part in designing the LSAP program, claim that it
resulted in fewer market dislocations and other negative externalities than initially were
feared—even with the Federal Reserve ultimately purchasing trillions in agency and
Treasury securities (17-20). The authors attribute this outcome in part to the sound program
management strategies employed by the FRBNY—especially the transparency with which it
purchased assets and its carefulness not to deplete the market of certain securities (Kohn
and Sack 2018, 19).
Subsequent Quantitative Easing Measures
Since the first LSAP, the Fed has completed two more rounds of quantitative easing. The
second round of quantitative easing was announced on November 3, 2010, and continued
through June 2011 (FOMC 2010b; FOMC 2011). The third round was announced in
September 2012 and terminated on October 29, 2014 (FOMC 2012; FOMC 2014).
When the Fed began to let assets roll off its balance sheet in 2018, scholars had expressed
confidence that the Federal Reserve’s later unwinding of crisis-era positions would not pose
systemic risk, primarily because of its continued “control of the federal funds rate even in an
environment of abundant reserves” (Kohn and Sack 2018, 19). More than a decade after the
onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve conducted a fourth LSAP program to
combat the negative economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Mendez-Carbajo 2020).
The move rapidly increased the size of the Fed’s balance sheet to more than $7 trillion in
assets—nearly eight times its size before the implementation of the first LSAP program in
2008 (Mendez-Carbajo 2020). As of this case’s writing, the Fed continues to purchase
Treasury securities and agency MBS at paces of roughly $80 billion and $40 billion per
month, respectively (FOMC 2021).
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V. Key Program Documents
Summary of Program
FAQ: Reinvestment of Principal Payments on Agency Debt and Agency Mortgage-Backed
Securities in Treasuries (FRBNY 10/05/2010) – Outlines how the FRBNY will reinvest
principal payments from agency debt and MBS into Treasury securities.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/faqs-reinvestment-principal-payments-agency-debtand-agency-mortgage-backed-securities.
Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work? (Gagnon et al. 2011) –
Provides a compressive overview of the LSAP program and the key decisions involved with
constructing the program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3480.
Implementation Documents
FAQ: Reinvestment of Principal Payments on Agency Debt and Agency Mortgage-Backed
Securities in Treasuries (FRBNY 10/05/2010) – Outlines how the FRBNY will reinvest
principal payments from agency debt and MBS into Treasury securities.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/faqs-reinvestment-principal-payments-agency-debtand-agency-mortgage-backed-securities.
Federal Reserve announces it will initiate a program to purchase the direct obligations of
housing-related government-sponsored enterprises and mortgage-backed securities backed
by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (11/25/2008) –Announces the implementation
of the LSAP program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/federal-reserve-board-governors-press-releasenovember-25-2008.
Frequently Asked Questions: Debt Purchases (FRBNY – 03/24/2009) – Webpage containing
operational details about the Fed’s purchase of agency debt within the LSAP program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3474.
Frequently Asked Questions: Debt Purchases (FRBNY – 08/20/2010) – Webpage containing
operational details about the Fed’s purchase of agency debt within the LSAP program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3475.
Frequently Asked Questions: Debt Purchases (FRBNY – 08/20/2010) – Webpage containing
operational details about the Fed’s purchase of agency debt within the LSAP program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3476.
Frequently Asked Questions: MBS Purchases (FRBNY – 11/18/2009) – Webpage containing
operational details about the Fed’s purchase of mortgage-backed securities within the LSAP
program, and it includes the names of managers and the custodian.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3478.
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Frequently Asked Questions: MBS Purchases (FRBNY – 08/20/2010) – Webpage containing
operational details about the Fed’s purchase of mortgage-backed securities within the LSAP
program, and it explains reduction in the number of managers.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3479.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
The Federal Reserve Act: Section 14, Open Market Operations (Federal Reserve
12/23/1913) – Provides the legal authority for the LSAP program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/federal-reserve-act-section-14-open-market-operations.
Press Releases/Announcements
Press Release (FRBNY – 11/25/2008) – Announces the LSAP program and the Fed’s
commitment to purchase up to $100 in agency debt and $500 billion in agency MBS.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/federal-reserve-board-governors-press-releasenovember-25-2008.
Press Release (FRBNY – 12/16/2008) – Clarifies the LSAP program as a monetary policy
measure adopted concurrent with a reduction in the Federal funds rate to 0%-0.25%.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/federal-reserve-board-governors-press-releasedecember-16-2008.
Press Release (FRBNY – 03/18/2009) – Announces the expansion of the FRBNY’s commitment
to $200 billion of agency debt, $1.25 trillion of agency MBS, and $300 billion of Treasury
securities.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3460.
Press Release (FRBNY – 11/04/2009) – Reduces the FRBNY’s commitment from $200 billion
of Treasury debt securities to $175 billion.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/federal-reserve-board-governors-press-releasenovember-4-2009.
Press Release (FRBNY – 08/10/2010) – Announces that the FRBNY would reinvest principal
payments from agency debt and MBS in Treasury securities, thereby keeping the Fed’s holdings
of securities constant.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/federal-reserve-board-governors-press-release-august10-2010.
Media Stories
The Buyer of Last Resort (Forbes – 03/18/2009) – Reaction to the Fed’s expansion of agency
debt and MBS purchases to $200 billion and $1.25 trillion respectively.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4453.
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Fed to Begin Buying Mortgage-Backed Securities (New York Times – 01/05/2009) –
Announces the Fed’s first purchases of agency MBS.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4456
Q&A: Quantitative Easing (Financial Times – 12/17/2008) – Defines quantitative easing in
general terms and calls quantitative easing uncertain and risky.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/qa-quantitative-easing.
Key Academic Papers
The Effect of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy
(Arvind and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011) – Finds that the LSAP program lowered MBS yields. They
also assert that the LSAP program succeeded in lowering corporate yields (by lowering
corporate credit risk).
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/effect-quantitative-easing-interest-rates-channels-andimplications-policy.
Estimated Impact of the Federal Reserve’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program
(Stroebel and Taylor 2012) – Concludes that changes in prepayment risk and default risk, not
government interventions, mainly drove the decline in mortgage rates.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/estimated-impact-federal-reserves-mortgage-backedsecurities-purchase-program.
Flow and Stock Effects of Large-Scale Treasury Purchases (D’Amico and King 09/2010) –
Concludes that the yields on Treasuries purchased under this program fell more than the yields
on those that were not purchased by the program, and asserts that the programs reduced
medium and longer-term Treasury yields.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/flow-and-stock-effects-large-scale-treasury-purchases
Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work? (Gagnon et al. 2011) –
LSAP program succeeded in lowering the term premium, MBS yields, and debt spreads. Also
provides the most comprehensive scholarly overview of the program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/large-scale-asset-purchases-federal-reserve-did-theywork.
The Large-Scale Asset Purchases Had Large International Effects (Neely 01/31/2011) –
Finds that the Fed’s announcements to purchase agency debt and MBS lowered yields and
interest rates for U.S. and foreign bonds.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/large-scale-asset-purchases-had-large-internationaleffects.
Reports/Assessments
Impact of the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing Programs on Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (FHFA OIG – 2014) – Argues that the LSAP program directly lowered mortgages, which
stimulated housing refinance activity.
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https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fhfa-oig-report-impact-federal-reserves-quantitativeeasing-programs-fannie-mae-and-freddie.

440

Journal of Financial Crises

VI.

Vol. 3 Iss. 1

Appendixes

Appendix A: FRBNY Purchases of Agency Debt (in billions of USD)

Note: Cumulative draws may not add up because of rounding. Source: FHFA and Treasury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix B: MBS Purchases January 2009-March 2010 (in billions of USD)
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Note: Cumulative dividends paid may not add up because of rounding.
Source: FHFA and Treasury.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appendix C: Nonstandard Monetary Policy Tools: Options
Open Market Operations
“Simple”
Buying longer-term
quantitative
securities
easing
(LSAP program)
Mechanics

Objective

Benefits

•

•

•

Purchase shortterm
government
securities
(conventional
open market
operations)

•

Incentivize
banks to lend
by ensuring
that they can
access
substantial
funding at low
costs

•

Approach
seemed to spur
minimal to

•

Special liquidity and
lending facilities

Purchase longer•
term securities:
government
securities, nongovernment
securities, or a
combination of the
two

Reduce term
spreads or credit
spreads, which
would lower
longer-term
interest rates

•

Estimates
suggested that
purchasing $50B

•

444

Create new facilities
or expand existing
ones

Communication and
commitment strategies

•
•

•
Support specific
funding markets by
assuring lenders that
they can fund debt
instruments,
boosting confidence
among borrowers to
issue and roll over
debt
Liquidity facilities in
operation at the time

•

•

•

Make explicit statements about
longer-term goals (especially
for inflation)
Announce a short-term
inflation target that is higher
than the longer-term inflation
target
Offer more explicit information
about the future path of the
federal funds rate
Lower market expectations
about the future path of shortterm interest rates, which
could reduce longer-term
interest rates
-Prevent market from
expecting deflation
Evidence outside the US
suggested that an “explicit and
credible” inflation target helps
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modest growth
in Japan, during
a period when
banks and
borrowers had
weak balance
sheets.

•

Drawbacks

•

The amount of
expected
growth
(minimal to
modest) seems
to determine
whether the
above fact is
more of a
benefit or a
drawback.

•

•

of longer-term
Treasury
securities would
lower yields by
approximately 2 to
10 bps, impact of
purchases would
compound as
Treasury
securities became
scarce.
After the FOMC
announced the
LSAP program,
agency debt and
MBS rates fell 60
bps, Treasury and
swap yields fell 20
bps, and corporate
bonds fell
10 bps.
The FRBNY
•
needed to
purchase a
substantial
•
amount of assets
to achieve any
effect.
Greatly expand the
Fed’s balance
•
sheet (risk of
capital losses as
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seemed to meet their
objectives1

•

Facilities needed to
comply with Section
13(3).
The Fed would take
on more credit risk
unless other parties
assumed substantial
first-loss positions.
-Moral hazard would
increase.

•
•

the public to anchor inflation
expectations and prevents the
“upward drift” of interest rates
during times of high
unemployment and slowing
inflation
Stimulate economic activity by
lifting inflation expectations
and lowering medium- and
longer-term real interest rates

Communicating policy
conditionalities to the public
could be challenging
Traditional monetary policy
tools may become constrained
at the zero lower bound, so
keeping rates lower for longer
may prolong the constraints.

The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–Module F

Thompson and Kulam

longer-term
interest rates rise)
1For

example, Term Auction Facility (TAF), Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Lending Facility (AMLF),
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).
Sources: FOMC 2008a, 17-18; Gagnon and Holscher (2008), 140.
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